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in itself gave reasonable assurance of acceptance of the suggested demands by us.
7.
Under these circumstances it appeared to all responsible officials that the mere effect of presenting an ultimatum would have achieved the desired end and any semblance of putting any measures into force would have coerced any remaining opposition.
8.
The proposals for coercive measures were given in my telegrams Nos. 287 and 288, and these would have been divided into four operations, namely,
(a) To garrison Shameen and to stop all movementa
of cargo junks.
(b) To stop all Chinese traffic approaching Canton
from the West River.
(c) To stop all Chinese traffic approaching from
the Canton River from seawards.
To demonstrate off the Bogue Forts.
(d) To stop all Chinese traffic entering Swatow.
Operations (a), (b), and (c) would have been enforced firstly and would, it was thought, have achieved our objective, and operation (d) would bat have been put into effect unless essential as this would have entailed evacuation of Swatow, which it was agreed was a necessary preliminary in this case, with consequent loss and damage to British property.
9.
For operation (a) at Shameen, it was proposed to allocate H.M.S. "TARANTULA", H.M.S. "MOTH" and H.M.S. "KOORHEN", and a munber of armed motor and steam launches for harbour patrol. With the garrison of two platoons and local volunteers this force would have been adequate to attain our objective. Two shallow draught lighters would have been kept available at Canton for evacuation in an emergency, and these could have been towed by "LOORHEN", either via Hamilton Passage or Honey Penny Greek, or by an Insect Class Gunboat via Money Penny Creek. Both these passages avoid the Danes Island and Bogue Defences.
Useful sailing directions for this passage have been prepared by the Commanding Officer, H.M.B. "DTH", and have been forwarded under cover of a separate submission No. H.K.4/2809 dated 9th October, 1926.
10.
It was agreed that these passages could be mined which was unlikely, or blocked which was a more likely proposition. It is known however that the inhabitants of these districts are decidedly anti-red and would most likely have given us warning of such measures, and if necessary assisted us in clearing them.
Further, many of these channels would be visited by armed launches and gunboats stopping traffic reaching Canton from the West and diverting it elsewhere (operation (b) 0, and adequate warning would have been obtained and assistance available from this source.
11.
The risk which this operation (a) entailed was therefore considered justified under the circumstances more especially when it is appreciated that the objective
was......
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